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2026-03-07Declare hmac, sha2 and subtle at the workspace rootsrdusr1-0/+3
crates/server takes all three with workspace = true for the Stripe webhook signature check, but the root manifest never defined them, so a clean checkout did not resolve. They were already in the tree through argon2; this only names them.
2025-12-15Harden for production: dependencies, headers, admin roles, docssrdusr1-0/+8965
Dependencies - The server build carried 37 known advisories, including RUSTSEC-2024-0363 in sqlx 0.7, which is the database layer. sqlx moved to 0.8 with default-features off, which also drops the MySQL and SQLite drivers and with them rsa and RUSTSEC-2023-0071. reqwest moved to 0.12, which brings hyper 1.x and was the sole source of every remaining advisory: h2 0.3, rustls-webpki 0.101, rustls-pemfile 1.0 and idna 0.3. - The server build now reports no known vulnerabilities against OSV. cargo audit itself would not compile, so the check queries OSV with the crate versions cargo tree reports for the server binary. - Cargo.lock is committed. This workspace produces binaries, so the lockfile is what makes a deployed build reproducible and the audit above meaningful. Headers - The application sent no security headers at all. The static server now sends a Content-Security-Policy, nosniff, frame options, a referrer policy and a permissions policy; the API sends a policy of its own, since it serves JSON and should load and frame nothing. - The one inline script in index.html moved to a file so script-src needs no unsafe-inline. WebAssembly needs wasm-unsafe-eval, without which nothing types at all, so that is present and explained. - Five style attributes moved to the CSSOM rather than adding unsafe-inline for styles. A style attribute in markup is refused by the policy; the same property set through element.style is not. Production configuration - With TYPERPUNK_ENV=production the server refuses to start if COOKIE_SECURE is off, if DATABASE_URL is still the development default, or if FRONTEND_ORIGIN is http on a non-local host. These were warnings, and a warning in a log nobody reads is not a safeguard. Administration - Moderators were appointed with psql. There is now an admin role, bootstrapped from TYPERPUNK_ADMIN_USERNAME at startup, and a UI to appoint and remove moderators. An administrator's own role cannot be changed through the API, so a mistake cannot lock everyone out of moderation. Corpus - scripts/export_approved.js writes approved submissions back into data/packs/community-*.json. Approved passages are served from the database and merged at startup, so without this the repository dataset and the live corpus drift apart, and a fresh checkout or the TUI sees only what shipped. Documentation - README rewritten for the repository: what it does, how to run it, the pack format, the server variables, deployment, and what the security posture actually is. Plain English, no em dashes, no emoji. Checked and found already correct: every private endpoint refuses anonymous callers, session cookies are HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax, CORS names a single origin, internal errors are logged rather than returned, and every query is parameterised.