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Writing PLUGINS.md as an authoritative external spec surfaced a real,
pre-existing bug: store.Summary/Entry/EntryTag/WSMessage, rules.Rule,
scope.Rule, and clientcert.Cert had no JSON struct tags at all, so Go's
default marshaling serialized them PascalCase ("ID", "StartedAt")
while the rest of the protocol (EntryDetail's own fields, every
Request/Response wrapper field) uses snake_case. Confirmed live against
a real daemon before touching anything: a raw socket "list" request
came back with "ID"/"StartedAt"/"StatusCode", exactly the mismatch
suspected. Nothing outside this repo's own Go code consumes this wire
format yet, so this was a free, purely additive fix rather than
something to work around - every affected struct now tags snake_case
consistently.
plugins/authcheck is the first real plugin: an Autorize-style
authorization checker. For every proxied request carrying an
Authorization or Cookie header, resends it with that header stripped
and compares status classes - a resend that still succeeds where the
original did too is a likely missing-function-level-access-control
bug, tagged authcheck:bypass with structured detail. Deliberately
speaks the wire protocol directly (its own local request/response/
summary/entryDetail structs mirroring the real ones field-for-field,
not imported from internal/ipc) rather than taking the shortcut a Go
plugin could - proof the documented protocol is actually sufficient on
its own, since that's all a non-Go plugin author has to work with.
Verified live end to end: a real daemon, a real Python origin with one
endpoint that looks like it enforces auth but doesn't (vulnerable by
design) and one that actually does (the control case) - the broken
endpoint was correctly tagged, the secure one correctly left alone, no
false positive, confirmed both via the stored tag data directly and
visually in the TUI (tmux, real keystrokes): the Tags column badge, T's
tag list, and the tag detail view's JSON-colorized data (ANSI-verified,
not eyeballed) all showing the plugin's actual findings.
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The proxy captured and stored literally everything with no way to
exclude unrelated traffic - every CDN asset, analytics beacon, and
third-party tracker request on a real engagement pollutes history and
search right alongside the traffic that actually matters.
internal/scope: Rule{Enabled, Pattern, IsRegex} and InScope(rules,
host). A non-regex pattern matches by case-insensitive substring
against the host - "example.com" matches "example.com",
"www.example.com", and "api.example.com" alike, covering "this domain
and its subdomains" without inventing a separate wildcard syntax.
IsRegex mirrors the same toggle match-and-replace rules already use,
for one consistent mental model across both rule types in this tool.
An empty or all-disabled rule set means everything is in scope - the
behavior before scope existed at all, unchanged, so a fresh install or
a user who never opens the scope view keeps recording everything
rather than silently nothing.
Deliberately a recording filter, not access control: out-of-scope
traffic still proxies completely normally, reaching its destination and
the client exactly as before. internal/proxy's forward() already writes
the response to the client before record() ever runs, so the scope
check (new in record()) can only affect whether the exchange gets
stored, never whether it happens. Blocking out-of-scope traffic outright
would be a materially different, much riskier feature - a wrong scope
pattern could silently break the very traffic someone's trying to test,
which is a far worse failure mode than a noisier history. Repeat/Intrude
(recordRaw, a separate function from record()) deliberately don't go
through the scope check at all: a user explicitly resending or fuzzing
a specific request wants to see the result regardless of scope, which
exists to cut passive-capture noise, not second-guess a deliberate
action.
internal/store: new scope_rules table (CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS, no
migration needed - it's a new table, not a new column on an existing
one) plus List/Add/SetEnabled/Delete, mirroring the existing
match-and-replace rules CRUD exactly. internal/ipc: scope_list/
scope_add/scope_delete/scope_toggle request types and matching Client
methods; scope_add validates a regex pattern compiles before persisting,
same reasoning and same fix as the earlier rules_save validation (an
invalid regex should be rejected up front, not silently never match at
apply time with zero feedback).
TUI: 's' from the history list opens scope management, mirroring the
Rules view's own list+form pattern but simpler (add-only, no
edit-in-place - a pattern and a regex toggle don't need a five-field
form, delete-and-re-add covers changing one).
Verified live in tmux against a running daemon: added a substring scope
rule for one host, sent requests to both a matching and a non-matching
host - the non-matching one proxied successfully (client got its 200)
but was never recorded, the matching one was recorded normally;
confirmed a Repeater resend of the excluded host WAS recorded despite
being out of scope; toggled the rule off and confirmed recording
resumed for everything; added and confirmed a regex-mode rule saves and
displays correctly; deleted a rule and confirmed the list returns to
empty ("no rules means everything is recorded").
go build/vet/gofmt/test/mod tidy all clean.
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