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Writing PLUGINS.md as an authoritative external spec surfaced a real,
pre-existing bug: store.Summary/Entry/EntryTag/WSMessage, rules.Rule,
scope.Rule, and clientcert.Cert had no JSON struct tags at all, so Go's
default marshaling serialized them PascalCase ("ID", "StartedAt")
while the rest of the protocol (EntryDetail's own fields, every
Request/Response wrapper field) uses snake_case. Confirmed live against
a real daemon before touching anything: a raw socket "list" request
came back with "ID"/"StartedAt"/"StatusCode", exactly the mismatch
suspected. Nothing outside this repo's own Go code consumes this wire
format yet, so this was a free, purely additive fix rather than
something to work around - every affected struct now tags snake_case
consistently.
plugins/authcheck is the first real plugin: an Autorize-style
authorization checker. For every proxied request carrying an
Authorization or Cookie header, resends it with that header stripped
and compares status classes - a resend that still succeeds where the
original did too is a likely missing-function-level-access-control
bug, tagged authcheck:bypass with structured detail. Deliberately
speaks the wire protocol directly (its own local request/response/
summary/entryDetail structs mirroring the real ones field-for-field,
not imported from internal/ipc) rather than taking the shortcut a Go
plugin could - proof the documented protocol is actually sufficient on
its own, since that's all a non-Go plugin author has to work with.
Verified live end to end: a real daemon, a real Python origin with one
endpoint that looks like it enforces auth but doesn't (vulnerable by
design) and one that actually does (the control case) - the broken
endpoint was correctly tagged, the secure one correctly left alone, no
false positive, confirmed both via the stored tag data directly and
visually in the TUI (tmux, real keystrokes): the Tags column badge, T's
tag list, and the tag detail view's JSON-colorized data (ANSI-verified,
not eyeballed) all showing the plugin's actual findings.
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Adds internal/clientcert: a cert/key pair matched to hosts by the same
substring-or-regex pattern model as scope.Rule, so mitmux can present
a client certificate on an upstream TLS handshake that requires one -
the previous behavior was a hard handshake failure with no way to
authenticate. Wired into both places mitmux dials an https:// upstream
over its own TLS client connection: proxy.go's handleConnect (live
proxied traffic) and repeat.go's dialForRepeat (Repeater/Intruder
resends), both through a new Server.clientCertFor(host) helper.
Stored in a new client_certs table, mirroring the existing scope_rules
persistence pattern. The TUI (`t` from history) is add-only like
scope, for the same reason: delete and re-add covers changing
anything, and it's a rarely-touched, low-cardinality list. The add
form takes cert/key file paths and reads them once at save time - PEM
content, not the path, is what's stored and later presented, so a
cert keeps working even if the original file moves afterward.
Verified live against a real mutual-TLS-requiring origin server:
without a matching cert the handshake correctly fails; with one
configured, the origin receives it and the request succeeds; toggling
it off reproduces the failure, confirming the enable/disable path
works end to end.
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