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Store had full CRUD for match-and-replace rules but no way to delete or
prune history at all - it only ever grew, with no way to remove an
accidental capture or start a new engagement clean short of manually
deleting the DB file outside the tool entirely.
internal/store: DeleteEntry(id) removes one history row and its
history_fts search index row in a transaction. ClearHistory() empties
both tables entirely; rules are untouched. internal/ipc: new
"delete_entry" and "clear_history" request types, Client.DeleteEntry/
ClearHistory methods.
TUI: 'x' deletes the selected history entry, 'X' clears the whole
database. Both gated behind a y/n confirmation - a small reusable
confirmPrompt/confirmYes model state, checked first in the history
list's key handling, so any key other than y/Y safely cancels rather
than falling through to whatever that key normally does elsewhere (this
also means ctrl+c during a pending confirmation cancels the prompt
rather than quitting - a deliberate fail-safe, not an oversight: quick
to dismiss, and a second ctrl+c then quits normally).
'X' is explicitly NOT scoped to an active search filter - it always
clears the true total (read from daemon status, not len(m.entries),
which would understate the count under a filter and make the
confirmation prompt itself misleading about what's about to happen).
Verified live in tmux against a running daemon with real captured
entries: 'x' shows "delete #N? y/n", 'n' cancels with the entry
untouched, 'y' deletes it and the list/count both refresh correctly;
'X' shows "clear all N history entries (not just this view)? y/n" with
the true count, 'y' empties the database (confirmed via direct SQLite
query: both history and history_fts at 0 rows afterward) and the TUI
correctly shows "history (0)" / "0 requests"; 'x'/'X' on an empty list
correctly no-op without crashing.
go build/vet/gofmt/test/mod tidy all clean.
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Closes the last two items from the original "worth considering" list.
Multiple listeners: -listen takes a comma-separated address list
(-listen "127.0.0.1:8080,127.0.0.1:8081"). Server.Addr became
Server.Addrs; ListenAndServe binds every address up front - before any
of them start serving - so a bad address fails startup immediately
rather than leaving the daemon partially listening, and rolls back
already-opened listeners if a later one fails to bind. All addresses
share the same handler/history/CA/rules: one logical proxy reachable on
more than one address, not several independent proxies in one process.
Upstream proxy chaining: -upstream-proxy host:port (optional http://
prefix, stripped for convenience) routes every outbound connection
through another HTTP CONNECT proxy instead of dialing origins directly.
dialViaProxy does the CONNECT handshake to the upstream and hands back
a plain net.Conn as if it were a direct connection; dialUpstreamTLS
(CONNECT/HTTPS path) and dialUpstreamPlain (plain-HTTP path) both take
an upstreamProxy parameter and route through it when set. The two paths
need different handling: CONNECT/HTTPS is transparent below the tunnel
(once the CONNECT handshake succeeds, TLS and the request on top of it
look identical to a direct connection, so roundTripH2 and the H1 read
side need no changes at all), but plain HTTP has to send an
absolute-form request line to the upstream proxy instead of origin-form
- so roundTripH1 gained a proxyForm parameter, and forward() selects it
based on scheme=="http" && UpstreamProxy!="".
Chaining into another intercepting/MITM proxy (including another
mitmuxd) needs that proxy's own CA trusted too, or TLS verification
fails - this is inherent to chaining MITM proxies, not a gap here, and
confirmed live below rather than left as a guess.
internal/proxy/dialer_test.go: dialViaProxy against a real local CONNECT
stub (not a mock) - direct dial, successful tunnel-and-echo through a
proxy, and a proxy that refuses the CONNECT with a non-200. All three
exercise the actual network code path, not just the string-building
around it.
Verified live: started a daemon with two -listen addresses, sent
requests through both, confirmed a single shared history; killed it
mid-flight with SIGTERM and confirmed both listeners closed cleanly;
started it with one bad address in the list and confirmed startup
failed immediately with the already-bound port released, no lingering
process. For chaining: sent plain HTTP and HTTPS through a downstream
mitmuxd configured with -upstream-proxy pointing at a genuine
passthrough CONNECT stub (tunnels raw bytes, doesn't MITM) and got real
content back on both; separately chained through a second mitmuxd
instance and got the expected "certificate signed by unknown authority"
error, cleanly recorded in history rather than hanging.
go build/vet/gofmt/test/mod tidy all clean.
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Trusting the CA was previously "import ca.pem into whatever's making
the requests" with no further help. -install-ca generates the CA if
needed and prints copy-pasteable, OS-specific steps, then exits without
starting the proxy.
Deliberately instructions-only, never auto-executing anything: Linux
trust-store tooling varies enough across distros (trust vs
update-ca-trust vs update-ca-certificates) that guessing wrong and
running the wrong command unattended is worse than asking, and
installing a root CA is a system-wide trust change affecting every TLS
connection on the machine, not just mitmux's own traffic - running the
printed command themselves keeps the user in control of that.
internal/ca/install.go: InstallInstructions(goos, caPath) dispatches by
OS. Linux detects trust (p11-kit - Arch, also on Fedora) /
update-ca-trust (RHEL/Fedora/CentOS) / update-ca-certificates
(Debian/Ubuntu/Gentoo) via PATH lookup and prints whichever is actually
present, plus separate certutil/NSS instructions for Firefox/Chrome's
own certificate store (which doesn't always follow the system trust
store on Linux). macOS (security add-trusted-cert) and Windows
(certutil -addstore / Import-Certificate) are implemented from each
platform's standard documented tooling but not verified live - no
macOS/Windows machine was available to test against, unlike Linux.
commandExists is a package var (not a direct exec.LookPath call) so
tests can fake which tools are "present" and exercise every detection
branch deterministically, independent of what's actually installed on
whatever machine runs `go test`.
Verified live: built mitmuxd, ran -install-ca against a throwaway CA
dir on this (Arch Linux) machine - correctly detected `trust` and
`certutil` on PATH and printed accurate commands, confirmed the CA
files were actually generated, confirmed no proxy/daemon process was
left running (exits immediately after printing), and confirmed running
it a second time reuses the existing CA (identical file hash) rather
than regenerating.
go build/vet/gofmt/test/mod tidy all clean.
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Payload processing: an optional case rule (upper/lower) and an optional
encode rule (URL/Base64/Hex/HTML) applied to every payload line before
it's substituted into the request, cycled with 'c'/'e'. Case always
runs before encode - folding an already-encoded value would corrupt it
(e.g. uppercasing Base64 padding). Applied entirely client-side in
startIntrude() (payload_rules.go): a pure string transform with no
proxy-side state, so it needs no protocol changes and reuses the
Decoder's own urlEncodeAll.
Grep-match/grep-extract: two optional Go regexps, edited with 'm'/'v'
using the same modal edit-buffer pattern as the history list's '/'
search (enter validates-and-commits, esc reverts to the last-confirmed
pattern, an unparseable regexp is rejected with an error rather than
silently accepted). Evaluated server-side, in internal/ipc/server.go's
"intrude" handler, against each result's actual entry.ResponseRaw -
that's where the real response bytes already are, and it's how Burp's
own grep options work (matched against the real response, not a
client-refetched copy). Grep-match flags a result (new Match column);
grep-extract captures the first submatch, or the whole match if the
pattern has no capturing group (new Extract column). Both patterns are
compiled once before the attack starts and apply for that run only, not
retroactively if changed mid-attack.
All four new keys (c/e/m/v) are gated to normal mode, checked in the
view's outer key switch before ever reaching the template/payloads
vi-textareas - otherwise they'd be either untypeable letters or steal
keystrokes mid-edit. Same discipline as the Repeater tab keys.
internal/ipc: Request gained GrepMatch/GrepExtract string fields (for
"intrude"), IntrudeResultMsg gained GrepMatch bool/GrepExtract string,
and the client Intrude() helper takes the two pattern strings as new
trailing parameters.
Verified live in tmux against a running daemon and real httpbin.org
traffic: built a template with a §marked§ query param, payloads 1/2/3,
grep-match `"id": "2"` and grep-extract `"id": "([0-9]+)"`, ran the
attack and confirmed the Match column flagged only the payload=2 row
and Extract correctly pulled 1/2/3 from each response respectively;
cycled case/encode through all states; confirmed an invalid regexp
(`[abc`) is rejected with a visible error and esc correctly reverts to
the last-confirmed pattern instead of committing the invalid one.
(Also confirmed, incidentally: a batch of vi normal-mode two-key
commands like "gg"/"dd" sent as one multi-character tmux send-keys
argument doesn't reliably reach the app as separate keystrokes - a
tmux scripting artifact, not a bug in the vi-mode implementation, which
works correctly when each key is sent as its own event, as any real
keypress would be.)
go build/vet/gofmt/test/mod tidy all clean.
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Repeater previously had one shared request/response buffer - sending a
new entry to Repeater silently overwrote whatever was already open,
even mid-edit. Replaced the singular reqArea/respView/repeaterScheme/
etc. model fields with a []*repeaterTab slice plus an active index;
'r' now opens a new tab and switches to it, existing tabs stay put.
New keys, all gated to normal mode so they stay inert while typing
(]/[ show up in JSON bodies constantly, and ctrl+w is the textarea's
own delete-word-backward that must still work mid-edit):
] next tab
[ previous tab
ctrl+w close the active tab (falls back to a neighbor, or to the
history list if it was the last one)
Async send results now carry the tab index they belong to, so a slow
send whose response lands after the user has switched tabs (or closed
one) updates the right tab rather than whichever happens to be active
when the result arrives; the status line and response pane only reflect
it live if that tab is still the one being viewed.
Verified live in tmux against a running daemon: opened two tabs from
different history entries, confirmed independent buffers, sent from a
background tab while another was active and confirmed the result routed
to the correct (non-visible) tab, switched with ]/[, closed with ctrl+w
down to zero tabs (falls back to the history list), and confirmed [, ],
and ctrl+w are all correctly inert in insert mode (typed "[a]" literally,
ctrl+w did textarea's word-delete instead of closing the tab).
go build/vet/gofmt/test/mod tidy all clean.
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First of the remaining "worth considering" items. A self-contained
tool ('d' from the history list, not seeded from any entry - this is
for arbitrary snippets, pasted tokens, encoded parameter values) with
a vi-modal input pane and a live output pane that updates on every
keystroke and every transform switch (tab/shift+tab cycles through the
8 transforms).
decoder.go is pure logic, deliberately kept separate from the TUI
wiring so it's directly testable: urlEncodeAll implements strict RFC
3986 percent-encoding (space -> %20) rather than using Go's
url.QueryEscape, whose form-encoding behavior (space -> '+') isn't what
"URL encode" means to a pentester reaching for this tool. Base64 decode
tries standard/URL-safe/padded/unpadded encodings in turn rather than
requiring the user to know which one they're looking at - real pasted
data is as likely to be one as the other. Decode failures return a
visible "(error: ...)" placeholder rather than blanking the output, so
a bad guess at the transform is obviously wrong rather than looking
like nothing happened.
decoder_test.go covers each transform directly, three "this input isn't
valid for this transform" error cases, and a round-trip matrix (all 4
encode/decode pairs against 5 inputs chosen to be awkward for at least
one encoding - spaces, slashes, HTML-special characters, empty string,
embedded newlines) confirming encode-then-decode always recovers the
original.
Single-transform only, not chained/pipelined like Burp's Decoder - v1
scope, tracked in PLAN.md.
Verified live: typed text and watched the output pane update in real
time; confirmed URL-encoding, then cycled to Base64 via tab and watched
it re-encode the same input live; confirmed the active-transform
highlighting via raw ANSI codes in the captured pane; fed invalid input
to Base64 decode and confirmed the error placeholder renders instead of
silently showing stale output; confirmed esc correctly backs out to the
history list.
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Next item off the "worth considering" list from the Burp/ZAP/Caido gap
research. Mark an entry with 'c' (from the history list or detail
view - no fetch yet, just remembers the ID), then 'c' on a different
entry fetches both and opens a colored unified diff of either side's
request or response, tab to switch between them.
Unified (git-diff style: +/- prefixed lines) rather than Burp's
side-by-side two-pane layout - a two-column view fights terminal width
for anything but a wide window, and unified reuses the same scrollable
viewport pattern already used everywhere else in this TUI rather than
needing new layout machinery. Uses github.com/pmezard/go-difflib
(SequenceMatcher-based, a tested port of Python's difflib) rather than
hand-rolling LCS/Myers diff, which has real edge cases worth not
reinventing. CRLF is normalized to LF before diffing - display-only,
same reasoning as the JSON pretty-printer - so an HTTP/1.1 exact
capture doesn't show every single line as changed purely from an
invisible trailing \r.
Verified live against two real, distinctly different captured POST
requests (different form bodies, different Content-Length): the request
diff correctly isolated exactly the two changed lines with the
unchanged headers shown as context, colors confirmed via raw ANSI
codes in the captured pane output (red 203 for removed, green 42 for
added) rather than assumed from the code, and the response tab showed
a correct independent diff of the two responses (Date header, JSON
body). Also confirmed the "same entry marked twice" path shows a hint
rather than silently doing something confusing.
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the third explicit ask, alongside the Burp/ZAP/Caido gap
pass and vi bindings: user-facing documentation. Covers what mitmux is
and why it's two binaries (daemon owns the proxy and history, TUI is a
thin client - restarting or crashing the UI never interrupts capture),
install/build, a quick-start walkthrough (start daemon, trust the CA,
point a client at it, open the TUI), per-feature usage (History,
Repeater, Intruder, match-and-replace), the full search syntax
(free text, host:/status:/source:/flagged: filters, AND/OR/NOT), the
vi-modal command set for the Repeater/Intruder editors, an architecture
section (daemon/TUI split, the raw-bytes-as-source-of-truth capture
model and exact-vs-reconstructed distinction), package layout, dev
commands, and an honest known-limitations list matching the scope
decisions already tracked in PLAN.md rather than overselling anything.
Verified rather than just written: built both binaries with the exact
commands in the Install section, ran mitmuxd with no flags to confirm
the documented defaults (127.0.0.1:8080, ~/.config/mitmux) are actually
what ships, ran the exact curl command from Quick start against a real
site through the proxy, and opened the TUI to confirm the captured
request actually shows up - the full documented flow, end to end, not
assumed correct because it reads correctly.
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