<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Cryptography on srdusr</title><link>https://srdusr.com/tags/cryptography/</link><description>Recent content in Cryptography on srdusr</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2026 23:11:47 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://srdusr.com/tags/cryptography/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Encryption Gives Confidentiality, Not Integrity</title><link>https://srdusr.com/blog/encryption-is-not-integrity/</link><pubDate>Fri, 27 Feb 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://srdusr.com/blog/encryption-is-not-integrity/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Encrypting data hides it. It does not prove the data was not changed. These are
two different properties, and assuming the first provides the second is the root
of a whole class of real vulnerabilities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="why-it-holds"&gt;Why it holds&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A cipher maps plaintext to ciphertext so an eavesdropper cannot read it. Nothing
in that mapping detects tampering with the ciphertext. In CBC mode an attacker
can flip bits and, given feedback on whether the result decrypts to valid
padding, recover and forge plaintext without the key. That is the
padding oracle attack, and it exists precisely because the system checked
confidentiality but never integrity.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>