From 7b9bf73e46102969d5802300469862296f979ef6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: srdusr <99972264+srdusr@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 16:11:00 +0200
Subject: Multiple proxy listeners and upstream proxy chaining

Closes the last two items from the original "worth considering" list.

Multiple listeners: -listen takes a comma-separated address list
(-listen "127.0.0.1:8080,127.0.0.1:8081"). Server.Addr became
Server.Addrs; ListenAndServe binds every address up front - before any
of them start serving - so a bad address fails startup immediately
rather than leaving the daemon partially listening, and rolls back
already-opened listeners if a later one fails to bind. All addresses
share the same handler/history/CA/rules: one logical proxy reachable on
more than one address, not several independent proxies in one process.

Upstream proxy chaining: -upstream-proxy host:port (optional http://
prefix, stripped for convenience) routes every outbound connection
through another HTTP CONNECT proxy instead of dialing origins directly.
dialViaProxy does the CONNECT handshake to the upstream and hands back
a plain net.Conn as if it were a direct connection; dialUpstreamTLS
(CONNECT/HTTPS path) and dialUpstreamPlain (plain-HTTP path) both take
an upstreamProxy parameter and route through it when set. The two paths
need different handling: CONNECT/HTTPS is transparent below the tunnel
(once the CONNECT handshake succeeds, TLS and the request on top of it
look identical to a direct connection, so roundTripH2 and the H1 read
side need no changes at all), but plain HTTP has to send an
absolute-form request line to the upstream proxy instead of origin-form
- so roundTripH1 gained a proxyForm parameter, and forward() selects it
based on scheme=="http" && UpstreamProxy!="".

Chaining into another intercepting/MITM proxy (including another
mitmuxd) needs that proxy's own CA trusted too, or TLS verification
fails - this is inherent to chaining MITM proxies, not a gap here, and
confirmed live below rather than left as a guess.

internal/proxy/dialer_test.go: dialViaProxy against a real local CONNECT
stub (not a mock) - direct dial, successful tunnel-and-echo through a
proxy, and a proxy that refuses the CONNECT with a non-200. All three
exercise the actual network code path, not just the string-building
around it.

Verified live: started a daemon with two -listen addresses, sent
requests through both, confirmed a single shared history; killed it
mid-flight with SIGTERM and confirmed both listeners closed cleanly;
started it with one bad address in the list and confirmed startup
failed immediately with the already-bound port released, no lingering
process. For chaining: sent plain HTTP and HTTPS through a downstream
mitmuxd configured with -upstream-proxy pointing at a genuine
passthrough CONNECT stub (tunnels raw bytes, doesn't MITM) and got real
content back on both; separately chained through a second mitmuxd
instance and got the expected "certificate signed by unknown authority"
error, cleanly recorded in history rather than hanging.

go build/vet/gofmt/test/mod tidy all clean.
---
 PLAN.md | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'PLAN.md')

diff --git a/PLAN.md b/PLAN.md
index 28b80e3..edaf599 100644
--- a/PLAN.md
+++ b/PLAN.md
@@ -167,8 +167,44 @@ to test against; only the command text itself (sourced from each
 platform's standard, documented tooling) is confirmed correct by
 inspection.
 
-Still open from "worth considering": multiple proxy listeners and
-upstream proxy chaining. Not started yet.
+Shipped since: multiple proxy listeners and upstream proxy chaining -
+the last two items from the original "worth considering" list.
+
+Multiple listeners: `-listen` takes a comma-separated address list
+(`-listen "127.0.0.1:8080,127.0.0.1:8081"`); all bound addresses share
+the same handler, history store, CA and rules - one logical proxy
+reachable on more than one address/port, not several independent
+proxies in one process. Every address is bound up front before any of
+them start serving, so a bad address fails startup immediately instead
+of leaving the daemon partially listening.
+
+Upstream proxy chaining: `-upstream-proxy host:port` (optional
+`http://` prefix, stripped) routes every outbound connection through
+another HTTP CONNECT proxy instead of dialing origins directly -
+chaining mitmux into Burp, a corporate proxy, or any other
+CONNECT-speaking proxy. SOCKS5 upstreams aren't implemented. For the
+CONNECT/HTTPS path, chaining is transparent below the tunnel: once the
+CONNECT handshake to the upstream proxy succeeds, TLS and the
+request/response on top of it are identical to a direct connection, so
+no other code needed to change. The plain-HTTP path is different: an
+absolute-form request line ("GET http://host/path HTTP/1.1") has to be
+sent to the upstream proxy instead of origin-form, so `roundTripH1`
+gained a `proxyForm` parameter and `forward()` selects it based on
+whether the request is plain HTTP and an upstream proxy is configured.
+
+Chaining into another intercepting/MITM proxy (including another
+mitmuxd instance) will fail TLS verification unless that proxy's own CA
+is separately trusted - expected, not a mitmux-specific gap: the
+upstream MITM terminates and re-signs the connection with its own CA,
+which mitmux's outbound TLS client (verifying against the system root
+store) has no reason to trust. Confirmed live: chaining through a
+genuine passthrough CONNECT proxy (tunnels raw bytes, no MITM) works
+correctly for both plain HTTP and HTTPS; chaining through a second
+mitmuxd instance correctly fails with a clear
+"certificate signed by unknown authority" error recorded in history,
+rather than hanging or crashing.
+
+This closes every item from the original "worth considering" list.
 
 Skipped deliberately (from the research, matches this tool's stated
 scope): active/passive vulnerability scanning, plugin marketplace,
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